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representing the European asylum system, examining the trade-off between the costs (both direct and political) and (public) externalities obtaining among the European countries. However, none of the above-mentioned studies explicitly consider a noncooperative game involving restrictive measures and spillover effects, in such a way as to allow for analysis of the effects of harmonisation.
In this paper we provide representation of a non-cooperative game in which the AS spillover effects amongst the European countries are explicitly represented. The aims pursued by the countries are also made explicit, in terms of their trade-off between forms of control (quotas of refugees which the countries are prepared to admit) and the degree of respect of rights which they deem desirable. Distinction is made between the role of the government, which, albeit within the limits of the European regulations, designs the national asylum system, and the role of the agencies implementing the national regulations. The government issues directives to implement restrictions consistent with the trade-off between the above aims, and the agencies implement the government's directives in accordance with the national regulations in force. The regulations set limits to the agencies' faculty to implement an effective restriction, which means that the agencies' restrictive powers may vary from one country to another depending on how the countries draw up their sets of regulations. On the basis of the differences shown by countries in terms of trade-off between the aims and in terms of the design of national standards, the various countries can be distinguished at the level of hawks and doves and analysis can be made of the consequences that the restrictions laid down by governments can have on burden sharing and respect of rights. Analysis can then be extended to the effects of harmonisation of procedures in terms of more uniform behaviour shown by the agencies of the various countries in implementing the restrictive measures determined by the governments.
The spillover effects entail strategic interaction amongst the countries, for each country can perceive, even indirectly, the restrictive measures of another and respond with its own restrictive actions. What emerges is a Nash-Cournot type of equilibrium and consequent adjustment dynamics in the face of external shocks modifying the inflows of AS. We have chosen to keep the math of the model very simple to make our work accessible to a wide readership 2 , without in any way detracting from the significance of the findings.
In chapter 2 we will go further into the observations made above, illustrating, also with reference to previous studies, the ways in which countries implement measures for deterrence entailing spillover effects, and the channels along which these measures become effective. We then go on to analyse the divergences between national regulations on asylum and refer on the scope of harmonising procedures.
In chapter 3 we come to basic representation of the non-cooperative game model and will look into the dynamic response of the system in the emergency circumstances of massive AS inflows.
In chapter 4 we complete the model, analytically introducing distinction between the role of governments, issuing restrictive directives, and the role of the refugee agencies which implement these directives. The interaction between governments and agencies is traced out, providing a more complete analytic definition of hawks and doves. The role of harmonisation is also analytically treated.
In the conclusions we will summarise the findings and comment on them in less technical terms.
-Burden sharing and respect of rights

Restrictive policies
States seek to balance control of the migration process with the humanitarian principles inherent in the articles of their constitutions and in the sensibility of their 'there is an incentive for States to use restrictive policies unilaterally in an attempt to limit the number of forced migrants entering their territory, while, at least indirectly, encouraging migrants to seek protection in another country or region'.
The second remark we come to is that these studies failed to take into consideration the measures adopted departing from the European rules, as noted in the above point 4). whether consideration extends to '3 rd safe countries' to which AS might legitimately be sent, departing from the non-refoulement principle;
whether there are time limits for examination of applications, supposing that excessively drawn out procedures amount to a form of deterrence;
the levels of appeal in place should international protection be denied, and procedures for issue of residence permits in such cases 9 .
In particular, a significant role appears to be played by the interaction between the government of a State and the complex of offices handling AS applications: we will refer to the latter as the refugee 'agencies'. The government draws up the national regulations in the context of the European Regulation. Furthermore, according to circumstances, it will issue directives to the agencies -based on its trade-off between control and humanitarian objectives -as to how the regulations are to be applied, exploiting the discretionary margins left in the national regulations and, in some cases, departing from the European regulations.
The way the procedures are conceived reveals different attitudes towards accepting applications in the different States (XXXX and YYYY (2011), Des Places and
Deffains (2004)). This brings us back to the point as to whether there are in fact hawks and doves among the European States and how this is reflected in the regulations and practices regarding acceptance of applications. Definition as hawks and doves should therefore be based on the degree of States' trade-off between control and humanitarian objectives, together with the design, in keeping with the level of trade-off, of the regulations drawn up to achieve these objectives.
Harmonisation
As to the effort to greater harmonisation, some positive results have been achieved. ElEnany and Thielemann (2010), for example, assert that 'the development of a common asylum law on the basis of EU minimum standards in this area has curtailed regulatory competition among the Member States and in doing so has halted the race to the bottom in protection standards in the EU'. However, we have considered the possibility that standards are in fact violated due to discretionary application of the regulations. In this view, the task for EASO, among its accomplishments, of disseminating good practices, may be interpreted as the idea that States would have more limited margins in interpreting the norms, and consequently reduced capacity to clamp down on AS flows.
Given the Dublin rules, harmonisation could entail a greater asymmetry in behaviours amongst States. Thielemann (2004) and (2012) The picture I wish to trace out now is rather more complex. In the previous discussion, in fact, it has been argued that, given spillover effects, there is competition between
States, which can lead to progressively tighter restrictions.
However, some States (doves) show more accommodating response to unexpected flows of AS. Thus the respect of rights also depends on the combined (noncooperative) action of all the States. In terms of this interpretation, the role of harmonisation and the issues of rights and burden sharing are closely bound up. In my representation of the facts, a sharper reaction on the part of a hawk would in any case meet with the reactions of the other States, and the final result will depend on the overall interaction at the level of the entire CEAS.
Theoretical representation
The theoretical approach to the issue of refugee burden sharing has failed to address these problems explicitly. In the literature the approach is to consider asylum as a public good, implying positive externalities amongst the various States participating, with non-cooperative distortions and free-riding which lower the overall level of well- What is missing in the literature is an analysis of the non-cooperative game played by the States in relation to asylum -an analysis that takes into explicit consideration the spillovers amongst the States deriving from restrictive measures. Nor do we have any theoretical representation of the role harmonisation may play in the outcome of the game. The need is to represent in a realistic, albeit stylised, way the limitations that harmonisation can set to the discretionary powers of the hawk-States that want to evade the regulations because of their aversion to refugees. We also need representation of how the inclusion of humanitarian objectives can balance all of this out and how interaction amongst the States can influence the outcome. Moreover, it is also necessary to introduce a measure of respect of rights and a measure of the burden sharing to evaluate the effect of harmonisation on the sound functioning of the CEAS.
We will be looking into these points in the following two chapters.
-Burden sharing in the 1980s and 1990s: a basic scheme
In the 1980s and up to the mid-90s the problem of receiving refugees in Europe had yet to be addressed following common rules. It was Germany that raised the issue of shares, calling for the participation of the other States so as to arrive at a more equitable distribution of refugees (Thorburn, 1995 , Hailbronner, 2000 . The failure of attempts to reach agreement on this point is indicative of the non-cooperative approach adopted by the States. A very simple way to represent the situation is to take the case of two States, State 1 and State 2. To focus examination on the essential elements of analysis, we will assume that the two States are absolutely identical in terms of reception capacity, however we may define it -for example, taking capacity indexes.
Thus distribution with a share of 1/2 for each of the States must be considered a fair deal. Let us suppose that each of the States takes charge of the AS crossing its borders. This is consistent with what was in fact the case subsequently with the Dublin rules. If, through a combination of pull-push factors, the AS made for the States in the proportion of 1/2, then this distribution would respect the refugees' human rights, being consistent with the choices they would make.
This raises two issues. The first arises when, for reasons related to particular pull-push factors (such as geographical proximity), the AS flows run in the direction of one of the States in a proportion greater than 1/2. The second problem arises when one of the two States is not prepared to take on even as much as a 1/2 share, finding it inconsistent with the objectives of domestic politics or too costly in social and financial terms. Of course, the two issues can also arise one on top of the other.
The model
We will therefore consider possible restrictive measures implemented by the State, which will indicate with the symbol r. In fact, r can be an index of restrictive measures, like the one formulated by Thielemann (2004), which we discussed in the previous sections, but it can also include pushback measures. For the purposes of analysis we will take value r as indication of the departure from the fair value, i.e. the value that is totally neutral at the level of restrictions. For example, the recognition rate is perfectly consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention on refugees, the choice of the third safe countries is based on criteria of effective and real 'safety', and the State makes provision for a decorous life for the refugees. These are all points we have already discussed.
Thus r = 0 is the fair value of the restriction index we take as reference. In cases of r < 0 it is understood that restrictions are underway and the refugees' rights are violated.
We will go on to assume that the restrictive measures have a real deterrence value, i.e. The equation for * is simply * = 1 -, from this it follows that σ*= λ , λ* = σ e ϕ * = 1 -ϕ . I suppose further the condition λ < 1 e σ < 1. This condition means that the AS shares react less than proportionally to restrictions, as also emerges from empirical findings.
If, because of geographic proximity or other pull factors, it happens that ϕ = 1/2, then it is possible to obtain a fair share distribution with no need of restrictive measures, i.e. with r = 0 and r* = 0 , that is without violating refugees' human rights.
In this case obviously it results that = 1/2 = ϕ e *= 1/2 = ϕ *. I denote as the target value of the share desired by State 1, and with the same for the State 2. Let us now introduce the loss functions of each State:
( ) P* = .
I will assume, in this first elementary treatment, that each State can utilize as it likes its restriction index r or r*, in order to minimize its loss. In the absence of any kind of coordination, the only solution is, obviously, = and * = 1 -= .
A first obvious remark is that the problem doesn't admit any solution unless it results that In this case there exist a infinite number of solutions, corresponding to all the combinations of r and r* which fulfil the relation σr -λr* + ϕ = . If , on the contrary, no solution exists. In this case, the ex post values of the shares always fulfil the + * = 1, however, at least one of the two States doesn't minimize its loss. Thus the shares are completely accidental and depending on a combination of events and on the reaction of the States in the circumstances.
Let us now briefly consider the first problem above, i.e. what happens when, due to an extraordinary event, there occurs a value ϕ' > 1/2.
Obviously, the fair solution is no longer possible, in particular the States manage the restrictions r e r* so as to restore the desired share in the loss functions. This entails the relation σr' -λr*' = ϕ -ϕ' < 0 = σr -λr*.
We will go on to observe that , if the State 1 sets a target < 1/2 (this is the second problem above), then a solution is possible only if > 1/2, that is if the State 2 is willing to assume an unfair share. The point is why it should do this, since it is suboptimal.
Then evidently the answer lies in an extension of the model. So, let us consider the attention State 2 pays to the AS human rights.
Let us then consider the State 2 (dove) loss function:
where ν* represents the weight State 2 attaches to the AS rights. It is clear that State 2 seeks to maintain the r* value close to zero, i.e. the fair value. The hawk, on the contrary, has not such a term in its loss function, which is thus still represented by
The model is thus formed by the equations (1) , ( ) e ( )'. A non-cooperative game entails that each uses its own instrument to minimize its loss, given the value of the instrument of the other player.
Thus we can obtain the solutions by solving the two reaction functions: = 0 and = 0 .
This provides the two simultaneous equations:
( ) σ (σr -λr + ϕ -) = 0 ; ( ) λ ( 1 -σr + λr* -ϕ -) + ν*r* = 0 .
By solving, it is obtained the Cournot equilibrium and the equilibrium values of r and r*. I will assume in the following that the solutions are such that r ≤ 0 e r* ≤ 0 . This is completely compatible with the assumptions on the coefficients and means that both the States exert a restriction or are fair as regards the AS human rights.
Let us observe that relation ( implies that = . I assume that and ϕ> . From ( it follows that r = ( -ϕ)/σ , namely that r < 0. Furthermore, looking at the equation ( ), it can be checked that the solution for r* is r*=0.
Summing up, if State 2 pays (even little) attention to the rights, then both the States reach the desired share This entails a violation of the rights by State 1 and full respect of human rights by State 2. All this solves the first problem above.
As to the second problem, let us suppose that < 1, in particular we can assume that 1/2 and 1/2. Once more, I assume that the State 1 is affected by a higher pressure than its desired share, namely that it is ϕ> . It can be readily be verified once again that the minimum condition ( entails that = , but a solution exists where also the ( ) condition is respected, with, obviously, * = 1 -> . That is to say, State 2 now is willing to accept a greater share than the desired one. Moreover with simple comparisons, it can be seen that the solution r < 0 and r* = 0 is no longer possible.
Comparative statics
We now need to study better the solutions of the , . To this end, we will write the system in the standard form:
Solving, it follows after a few steps:
(as verification, if one sets ϕ 1/2 , it emerges the fair solution r = 0, and from ( )' it follows also that r* = 0).
With simple computation we obtain:
As for r*, we obtain , for example from ( )': (6) = 0; = .
1. If a positive shock on ϕ occurs, say ϕ > 0, i.e. if the AS are pressing on the State 1, then we see that this leads to an equilibrium E' in which it is Δr < 0 and Δ r* = 0, which entails greater restriction by State 1 and no change of the restrictions by State 2. This confirms what we previously found by inspecting the , This is done starting from any initial equilibrium, since the derivatives of r and r * are constants, for any shock ϕ > 0. Eventually, as regards the share ex-post, it will turn out that = while *= + ϕ, namely State 2 entirely absorbs the shock and State 1 restores the desired share.
Let us see now what happens if State 1 reduces its target share, that is if it sets
< 1/2, while remains fixed at its initial value and thus < 1. I will indicate with E'' the new equilibrium that ensues. By computation, we can see that < 0 if and only if
Note that it turns out that >0 , under the assumption made at the beginning that λ < 1.
From the formulas above it is seen that has the same sign of , and therefore it is now < 0.
For which, if <0, then it also turns out that >0 and r*>0.
Under these assumptions, it is clear that, under inequality (d), if the State 1 reduces its desired share, the new equilibrium that ensues involves an enlargement by both States
Adjustment to external shocks
The important issue now is to examine the adjustment. That is the question of the stability of equilibria. Here the tools of the adjustment are r and r *. Observe that the necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of equilibria in the dynamic process described is that ( / ) < 1. This is therefore true if and only if the condition (d) does not hold. Under these assumptions, we can perform an analysis of the stability of equilibria.
Suppose now that inequality (d) is fulfilled and that the hawk State first reacts to
shocks, because it is there that the shocks occur first. If we represent the reaction functions in the plane (r, r *), the situation is illustrated in Figure 1 (a) and (b).
Figure 1 about here
In the case of an adjustment from E to E ', that is, if we examine the case in which a shock occurs like Δφ> 0, the process is generally unstable. However, the particular relative position of the two equilibria (it is Δr * = 0),entails that if State 1 reacts first, then the equilibrium E ' is reached in one move. Otherwise, the new equilibrium is not reached. In the case of adjustment from E towards E'', i.e. when State 1 reduces its target share , the process is unstable. This implies that, if State 1 responds first, then increasingly marked restrictions take place. It is a process of competitive restrictions between States, which can lead to serious violations of human rights of AS by both
States.
By contrast, we can analyze the adjustment in the case where the inequality (d) is not verified, that is, when ν* > . In this case the relative slope of the two reaction functions is exchanged and is > . It is easy to verify in this case (figure not shown) that equilibrium E' is stable, and if the State is to move first, then in one move the system reaches the new equilibrium. In this case, State 2 absorbs all the variation in the shares induced by the shock. Equilibrium E'' now entails a restriction by both the States, namely <0 e r* <0.
Finally, let us consider the case of pressures on State 2, not analysed so far, is obtained observing that a pressure on State 2 corresponds to * > 0, , i.e. < 0. If State 2 is a dove, we may presume that it will not attempt to make any great change in its ex-ante share ; hence the analysis is as in the case of point 1 above, with equilibrium E' which continues to show r*=0 ,, with no extra restriction on the part of the dove, and r>0, i.e. relaxation of restrictions by State 1, subject to less pressure on its share than in the previous position. All this very simply follows from (5) and (6). In this case, therefore, conditions for the human rights of the AS in general actually improve.
Let us summarise the stylised facts appearing in this section. The lack of a State functioning as dove entails inconsistency in national objectives. Each State reaches the desired share of AS which it is prepared to admit and a share of applicants is rejected outside Europe.
On the other hand, the presence of a dove State creates conditions for the shocks to be absorbed and the violations of rights limited. If, however, the hawk adopts particularly aggressive attitudes, seeking to reduce the share of AS it had been accepting, then if the dove is a 'moderate' one (i.e. it doesn't attribute a particularly great weight to respect of rights), Europe's AS reception process may fail to follow a convergent trend, with serious violations of rights. If, on the other hand, the dove attaches great weight in rights, then the trends are stable. By contrast, in the case of pressures on the dove's share no destabilising trends are generated.
-European regulations and harmonisation
Subsequent to the Stockholm Conference at the end of the 1990s, the European Union started on construction of a common asylum system. With reference to the model illustrated in the previous section, the situation can be summed up with the observation that the States would no longer be free to fix the restriction indexes r and r* as they liked, but restrictions were to be subject to certain rules.
The model
We will assume that the restrictions applied by the States derive from the attitudes of the respective governments, which may be more or less averse to letting AS cross their State borders. Thus the government, in the various circumstances, gives content to a demand for restrictions which corresponds to a certain degree of aversion towards AS.
We will represent this introducing a variable R. For example, in the case of a massive and unexpected inflow of AS, we may imagine that the government will issue restrictive directives showing a high value of R.
Restrictive policies are implemented by an Agency for Refugees, which handles the entire reception processes, examination of applications and other restrictive measures.
We will therefore consider how an Agency implements the restrictive directives which the government may issue in particular circumstances. This depends on the national regulations which apply to the Agency's activities. It is beyond our scope here to provide a microfoundation of Agency behaviour. Formulation will be confined to stylised representation. Let us recall the significance of restriction index r, which encapsulates the intensity of the overall restriction implemented by applying the national regulations. The variable r is calculated in terms of the departure from 'fair value', so that r < 0 indicates a restriction under way and > 0 indicates the intensity of the restriction. Given directives R, the Agency implements the restrictive measures exploiting the margins of freedom left by the national regulations. We will indicate with E the restrictive effort implemented by the Agency, defined as the total restriction it is able to carry out. The effort will be all the greater the stronger proves the intensity of restriction and the higher the number of AS submitting applications, i.e. A. To see how this works let us take as an example the case in which the restrictive measure consists in reducing the recognition rate. Thus r indicates the departure of the recognition rate from the fair value. In this case the restriction index is a percentage value which reduces the number of applications accepted. Thus the total restrictive effort amounts to E = . In the general case, r encapsulates the intensity of all the restrictive measures implemented. Many of these cannot be represented by a percentage 12 . Let us take, for example, the case of expedited procedures, which are applied to AS from certain particular countries of origin, with diversified effects for the diverse AS categories. To give aggregate representation of how the measures are applied to the number of AS, we will introduce elasticities and and present representation E = .
The value of the elasticities depends on the design of the national regulations and the degree of discretionary/arbitrary powers with which the regulations can be applied.
The greater these powers, the greater will be elasticity , and it will in fact be 12
The percentages can be calculated ex-post, i.e. once the results of the restrictions become measurable.
possible to apply the restriction to a far broader range of AS. On the contrary, with greater discretionary/arbitrary powers will prove smaller. In fact, in this case the restrictive measures can be applied departing from the regulations and the intensity of restriction inherent to the standards can be circumvented. To clarify the point, let us take, for example, the case of the restriction applying the 3 rd safe country clause: if there is an arbitrary margin, the clause can be applied to categories of AS that should not in principle be involved. For example, countries that are not really safe can be included in the list of 3 rd safe countries simply because they have seen the transit of many AS. Thus attention focuses not so much on the way of defining 'safety' i.e.
as on the number of AS to whom the restriction is applied.
In summary indicates the restriction effort of the Agency referring to the number of the AS. We can define this value as an absolute aversion to the AS, as contained in the rules.
indicates the weight of the index of intensity of restriction |r| and is correspondingly smaller, the greater is the degree of discretion/arbitrariness that the national rules allow the Agency.
Let us sum up the discussion by linearising the relation E = :
The equation represents the equilibrium between the restriction action of the Agency and the directive of restriction by the Government.
A relation similar to (7) holds for State 2 thus the model takes now the form:
(1) = σr -λr* + ϕ ;
(7) R = -r ; (8) R* = *(1-) -*r* .
The loss functions are still:
Let us recall the relations, still valid, * = 1 -e σ*= λ , λ* = σ e ϕ * = 1 -ϕ .
Let us then consider the case of a shock Δφ> 0 on the number /share of AS that goes to the State 1.
The impact response can be computed, for given r*, by the equations (1) e (7). By simple computation, we can see that it turns out < 0 if and only if the parameters verify the relation > . In this case moreover it also turns out that r < 0. Thus State 1 reacts limiting access with a grater restriction. The same applies when r* < 0 for given ϕ , namely if the State 2 makes a restriction. The direct opposite when
. Given the meaning of and , I refer to the ratio as representing the conditional aversion to AS. All this allows for a definition of hawk and dove.
-The hawk has a strong conditional aversion to AS , namely it holds > , and no attention to the human rights of the AS, namely ν = 0 .
-The dove has a limited aversion to AS, namely < , and pays attention to the AS rights, namely ν* > 0 .
To solve the model, we can consider the reduced form: By computation, they are :
where we I have set = ; = ; = +βε -β + β .
Note that , if ν* = 0 , then it turns out that = , and this implies that there are infinite solutions, or there is no solution. This depends on whether or not the constant terms are collinear with the matrix of coefficients (in this case they must be equal. By computation, this happens if ). This confirms the stabilizing role of the dove, much as we saw in the previous chapter.
Adjustment to external shocks
What matters is the relative slope of the two reaction functions. Using the definitions of and , we can see that, provided that ν* > 0 , it turns out that < if and only if the inequality holds:
Let us recall that 0 < < implies that the dynamic process is unstable. On the contrary > entails stability. So let us consider the two cases:
(I) State 1 is hawk and State 2 is dove. This means that the harmonisation of standards is not strong enough to reduce the hawk's conditional aversion. Then it holds > 1. This implies that C < 0. From this, it will be readily be seen that α>0; β<0;
<0. Furthermore, from the definition of , by routine computation it follows also that < 0. Therefore, it is easily checked that >0 . Moreover, the relation (12) is also fulfilled and thus the process is unstable.
(II) Harmonisation is strong enough to reduce the conditional aversion of both the States. Observe that, if a/b is sufficiently small, Then it holds < 1 and, if also a*/b* is small, then C > 0. We will not go into analysis of the signs of the coefficients, which are combined in a different way now. With long and tedious calculations it is seen in this case that > > 0 and thus the adjustment process is stable.
Consider now the dynamics which emerge in case (I). From equations ( )'' e ( )''
we obtain the equilibrium values of R and R*. By differentiating , it can be obtained that < 0 and, under reasonable assumptions, that also < 0 .
In this case the adjustment processes follow dynamics similar to the example illustrated in figure 1(b), chapter 3 (but with R and R* as variables at the axes and following mirror-image progression): hence the considerations made in chapter 3 apply equally here. In particular, with scant harmonisation the possibility emerges for competitive restrictions leading to restrictive directives, or in other words increasingly raised values of R and R*. From equations (9), (10) and (11), it will be seen that the effects of restrictions on A, r and r* entail R and R*effects of the opposite sign. This results in oscillating trends in A, r and r*, with non-convergent dynamics 13 , which means that the shares of AS fail to arrive at any well-defined final values while both
States can also take turns in violating the rights of the AS, to a more or less accentuated degrees. On the other hand, with fuller harmonisation the adjustment trend is stable and competitive restrictions accordingly come to an end when a new equilibrium is arrived at. We will comment on this in the conclusions.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to examine the European asylum system in terms of AS burden sharing and their rights, and in this context to see whether harmonisation of the regulations can help towards achieving both objectives.
To this end, we began with a model in which each State takes charge of the AS crossing its borders in accordance with the Dublin regulation, or with the practice followed prior to the regulation. Each State has means of restriction at its disposal which are applied to flows of AS towards that State. The occurrence of spillover implies a non-cooperative game, in which the States compete with one another to achieve each its own objectives, expressed in terms of trade-off between access control and humanitarian considerations. What emerges from the first simple model, as crucial to the coherency of the entire system, is that one of the States (which we identify as 'dove') attributes some weight to humanitarian objectives. If there is no dove, there are no well-defined equilibria and the system dynamics follows an erratic trend with shares of AS that depend largely on those geopolitical circumstances that give rise to considerable inflows of AS in certain European counties. With this first
13 Generalisation of the model, hypothesising more complex behaviours on the part of the agents in the game, could show chaotic trends with dynamic paths greatly dependent on the initial conditions (butterfly effects) and thus fundamentally erratic functioning of the entire asylum system. For the chaotic microeconomics see Lorenz (1989) and Medio and Lines (2004 The second model introduces the national asylum regulations showing a minimal degree of harmonisation in accordance with the European Directives, but leaving discretionary/arbitrary margins which the States can exploit to achieve their national objectives. The aim of this analysis is to see whether grater harmonisation, setting limits to the discretionary/arbitrary powers of the States, can lead to a fairer asylum system, in terms of both fair AS burden sharing and greater respect of rights.
Harmonisation of the regulations and procedures is achieved through a complex feedback system going through the actions of each State's refugee Agency, taking into account the governments' aversion to AS. This implies a more refined definition of hawks and doves than used in the previous model; what matters here is the degree of aversion to AS, displayed through the restrictions implemented by the Agencies.
Again, in keeping with the findings of the previous section, we see the stabilising role played by the dove State, whose presence is indispensable to achieve a stable process of adjustment to the impact of exogenous shocks on the distribution of AS amongst the States. Here the feedback differs from that of the previous model, serving now to indicate the conditional aversion of each State towards the AS, i.e. the way national regulations allow in practice for restrictions to be made on the AS flows.
We had conjectured that the degree of aversion implicit in the regulations can be reduced through more intensive harmonisation. In this case, on the evidence of analysis of the system dynamics, we may state that situations of unlimited competitive restrictions amongst the States, with all the risks of serious violation of the human rights of the AS, can in fact be avoided. Also in terms of the contribution that harmonisation can make towards fairer burden sharing amongst the States, the presence of a dove country can, as in the previous section, constitute an implicit, albeit minimal, form of cooperation. And again harmonisation has a contribution to make, stabilising the adjustment process and affording the dove the possibility to play its role more effectively in sharing shocks amongst the States.
Thus we must qualify the observation advanced by Thielemann (2004) that harmonisation can 'undermine' the process of European cooperation, and that it can prove 'counterproductive to the aim of more equitable asylum burden-sharing in Europe' since it could aggravate competition amongst the States. The situation described by Thielemann is reflected, in our model, in the circumstances in which the States compete in addressing massive and unexpected inflows of AS with a disorderly succession of restrictions. Such are the cases of unstable dynamics. By contrast, we have shown how greater harmonisation can bring stability to the process. This implies that the competition amongst the States will in any case be on a limited scale, and consequently the effects on burden sharing will not prove disastrous. This also applies at the level of respect of rights.
Ultimately, then, harmonisation can enable greater consistency in policies and effective restrictive actions. Nevertheless, it cannot suffice to construct a fair and effective CEAS, for it may play a stabilising role, but lacking the capacity to achieve in toto the two objectives at the level of shares and rights. The real reason, as emerges clearly from our analysis, lies in the impossibility of physically re-allocating the AS, in the aversion to AS implicit in the States' objectives, which is not susceptible to harmonisation, and in the occurrence of asymmetric shocks on AS flows. As long as there are asymmetric shocks with no clear rule for physical AS re-allocation, we will continue to witness spells of access restriction and violation of rights.
